Habermas Translation: Dialectic of Secularization (pt. 2)

Here is the second installment of my attempt to translate Habermas (first part here; Original German here). I’m trying to translate the piece one section at a time (which Habermas has generously broken down into an average of 4 or 5 paragraphs each), since I don’t have a huge amount of time available for longer portions. I hope no one minds.

This section remains mostly factual, but he is now beginning to set the stage for his argument to come. As usual, if anyone notes something funny in my translation, please let me know (there’s one sentence which totally eludes my efforts to translate literally; if anyone can find a better solution, I would be very grateful).

UPDATE: A second look at the troublesome sentence just mentioned made me realize that it wasn’t tricky at all — I was just ‘complexifying’ it for no good reason.  I’ve now fixed it.

The Vitality of the Religious

[6] There are, above all else, three imbricated phenomena, which have concentrated themselves into giving the impression of a world-wide ‘resurgence of religion’ [Habermas uses the English here]: (a) the Proselytizing character [missionarische Ausbreitung] of great world religions (b) their fundamentalist tenor, and (c) the political instrumentalization of their potential for violence [Gewaltpotentiale].

[7] (Viz. a) An indication of its vitality is given by the fact that, within the established religious institutions and Churches, orthodox or in any case conservative groups are generally on the march. This equally applies to Hinduism and Buddhism as much as to the three monotheistic religions. Strikingly, the established religions are most widely spreading in Africa and East- and South-Asian countries. Their proselytizing achievement [or perhaps success] also depends upon the mobility of their organizational forms. The Multicultural, international Church of Roman Catholicism [for instance] better adapts itself to trends in globalization than the nationally centered constitution of Protestant Churches, which are suffering from the greatest congregational losses. [And] the decentralized network of Islam (above all in sub-Saharan Africa), as well as the Evangelical Christianity (especially in Latin America) are the most aggressively expanding [religions]. All of these Religions are characterized by single, charismatic figure, who aroused religious sentiment.

[8] (Viz. b) The most prolific religious movements, such as the Pentacostals and the radical Muslims were the first to allow themselves to be called ‘fundamentalist.’ They struggle against the modern world, or withdraw themselves form it. In their cult [Kultus] they bind spirituality and apocalypticism [Naherwartung] together with rigid moral codes and biblical literalism. These movements stand opposed to the flaky ‘new religious movements’ that originated in the 70s and the earlier ‘Californian’ syncretism. Admittedly, with their Evangelical elements, these fundamentalisms ‘de-institionalize’ [entinstituionalisierte] the form of religious praxis. In Japan nearly 400 such [syncretic] sects, which jumble together elements of Buhdism and folk-religion [Volksreligion] with pseaudo-science and esoteric doctrines, have emerged. [And] The State’s crackdown on the Falun Gong Sect in the People’s Republic of China has called attention to the large number of ‘New Faiths,’ whose adherents there are estimated to be approximately 80 million.

[9] (Viz. c) The regime of Mullahs in Iran and Islamic terrorism are only spectacular examples of the political birth of the religious potential for violence [Gewaltpotentiale]. Often, the flames of conflict, which have an other, profane origin, first inspire religious codification. This is certainly true for the ‘de-secularization’ [Entsäkularisierung] of the Middle East conflict, as well as for the politics of Hindu Nationalism and the long-standing conflict between India and Pakistan, or even for mobilization of the Religious Right in the USA before and during the invasion of Iraq.