Page 123

A couple of days ago, NP tagged me with this meme:

1. Pick up the nearest book (of at least 123 pages)
2. Open the book to page 123
3. Find the fifth sentence on that page
4. Post the next three sentences
5. Tag five people

And since I’ve been all too quiet for far too long, perhaps this little exercise is just what I need to get back into the swing of things. So here goes. The closest book to hand, when I read NP’s post was Hans Blumenberg’s Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie (Paradigms for a Metaphology). The Requisite sentences run as follows (and you have my apologies for the Ancient Greek. I can’t speak or read it, and can only recognize a few words. To avoid as many mistakes as possible, I’ve decided against transliterating anything. I hope it’s not too awful), which play on the notion of disease in a way that’s germane to this meme:

Die Stoiker hatten in ihrer Logik die Lehre von den Urteilsqualitäten unter dem Gesichtspunkt einer >Stellungnahme< der Vernunft zu puren Aussageinhalten entwickelt: die Souveränität der Vernunft manifestiert sich in ihrer Freiheit zur ἐποχῄ, in ihrer Verweigerung des Zuschlages vor der völligen Ausweisung des Gegenstandes. Hier aber entfaltet das Wahrsheinliche seine zur Voreiligkeit (πςοπῑωσἱα) verführende Kraft, virulent gemacht vor allem durch die Rhetorik, der wiederum die Dialektik gewachsen machen soll. Die stoische Dialektik, mit ihrem Ziel der ἀπςοπτωσἱα, will die Vernuft gerade gegen das Wahrscheinliche feien, sie will den Gleichmut als die Stärke der Vernunft gegenüber dem Wahrscheinlichen, dem sie nicht nachgeben soll: ῑήν ῑε ἀνειχαηῑα ἰσχνςόν λόγον πςός ῑό εἰχός ὤσῑε μὴ ἐνδιδόυαί αὐτῶ. In der scharfen stoischen Diathese von Innerlichkeit und Außenwelt wird die πιανότης zum Grundcharakter des Hereinwirkens der Dinge >von außen<, vergleichbar mit den >rhetorischen< Einwirkungen von Menschen, die an der Lenkung der Zustimmung irgendwie interessiert sind.
Bei Augustin kommt die Ambivalenz der >Wahrscheinlichkeit< mit Beiden Aspeckten zur Geltung.

And now for an attempt at translation:

In their logic, the Stoics had developed a theory of the qualities of judgment from the perspective of their “position” concerning Reason’s pure assertion of content: the sovereignty of Reason manifested its freedom by way of the “ἐποχῄ” (Epoche) — in Reason’s denial of any content prior to the total banishment of concrete, external objects. Here, however, the notion of probability developed its agency or power prematurely; ensnared and made virulent, above all, by Rhetoric, it ought to have strengthened dialectics. For the Stoic dialectic, with its goal of ἀπςοπτωσἱα, aimed to immunize Reason against Probability. As opposed to it, Dialectics meant equanimity (perhaps univocity — me). And, as Reason’s forte, it should accommodate nothing else than the necessity of reason itself: ῑήν ῑε ἀνειχαηῑα ἰσχνςόν λόγον πςός ῑό εἰχός ὤσῑε μὴ ἐνδιδόυαί αὐτῶ. Stoicism’s pronounced diathesis [there's a play here between a thetic dualism and a medical condition wherein a patient exhibits a pronounced tendency towards a particular state, which I don't know how to capture exactly] of interiority and exteriority became the πιανότης characterizing the ground of a thing’s internal-affective potentials, as originating “from outside.” Man’s “rhetorical” interventions, which are in any case interested in controlling affirmation or assent, were similarly conceived.
With Augustin, we find an ambivalence towards Probability, in both aspects of validity.

So that’s it. Now I suppose I have to ‘nominate’ five folks to pass on the blogosphere’s version of the flu. I hereby infect Mikhail and Shahar of Perverse Egalitarianism, Dan from SOH-Dan, Joseph Kugelmass from you know where, and Sinthome from Larval Subjects.